Yanxi Hu

Yanxi Hu

Oct. 30, 2026

Judicial independence, Court governance, De-administration, Judicial responsibility system, Power allocation.

Based on the realistic context of the rule of law construction in China, this paper focuses on the institutional obstruction encountered by the principle of judicial independence in the internal operation of the court. In view of the implicit restriction of the inertia of administrative management on the independent judgment of judicial power in current practice, this paper probes into the coupling mechanism between judicial independence and the internal governance structure of the court. The generalization of the examination and approval authority of the president, the alienation of the functions of the audit Committee and the lack of professional security constitute the structural tension in the current internal governance. Therefore, this paper constructs a power reconstruction model based on trial centralism, and advocates that the core business of trial should be physically separated from judicial administrative affairs. By refining the list of rights and responsibilities, breaking the rigid management of posts and establishing the bottom line of duty exemption, the system puts forward the optimization scheme. Scientific internal governance structure is not only the key to improve judicial efficiency, but also the cornerstone to ensure the independent exercise of judicial power according to law. Only by clarifying the power boundary in an institutionalized way can “let the judges judge” move from slogan to essence and promote the perfection and maturity of Socialism with Chinese characteristics’ judicial system.

© 2026, the Authors. Published by ISCCAC

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license